COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT
 
                       COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
 
                           NO. 84130
 
 
 
MARZELLA COLEMAN, ET AL.        :
                                :      ACCELERATED DOCKET
          Plaintiffs-Appellants :
                                :         JOURNAL ENTRY
    -vs-                        :
                                :              and
KAISER PERMANENTE OF OHIO ETC. :
                                :            OPINION
          Defendant-Appellee    :
                                :
 
 
DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT                  OCTOBER 14, 2004
OF DECISION:
 
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:        Civil appeal from
                                Common Pleas Court
                                Case No. CV-458458
 
JUDGMENT:                       Affirmed.
 
DATE OF JOURNALIZATION:
 
APPEARANCE:
 
For Plaintiffs-Appellants:      PAUL M. KAUFMAN
                                801 Terminal Tower
                                50 Public Square
                                Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2203
 
For Defendant-Appellee:         DENNIS R. FOGARTY
                                Davis & Young
                                1700 Midland Bldg., 101 Prospect Ave.
                                Cleveland, Ohio 44115
 
                                MARILENA DISILVIO
                                THOMAS B. KILBANE
                                HOLLY M. WILSON
                                Reminger & Reminger Co., LPA
                                1400 Midland Bldg., 101 Prospect Ave.
                                Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1093
 
 
 
 
 
                               -2-
 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.:
 
     In this accelerated appeal, appellant Marzella Coleman appeals
 
from the trial court's entering summary judgment in favor of
 
appellee Kaiser Permanente of Ohio, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
 
of Ohio, Ohio Permanente Medical Group and Kim Fitzgerald, M.D.
 
(collectively referred to as Kaiser where appropriate) on her
 
medical malpractice claim. Coleman assigns the following error for
 
our review:
 
     "The trial court committed error by granting summary judgment
 
to the defendants, Kaiser Permanente, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
 
of Ohio, Ohio Permanente Medical Group and Kim Fitzgerald, M.D."
 
     Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the
 
trial court's order. The apposite facts follow.
 
     Coleman filed suit against Kaiser for medical malpractice.
 
Coleman contended Dr. Fitzgerald failed to diagnose her urethral
 
diverticulum condition, which resulted in Coleman enduring several
 
months of pain. Coleman consulted another physician who correctly
 
diagnosed and resolved her problem.
 
     Initially, Coleman failed to provide an expert report to
 
support her claim of malpractice; therefore, Kaiser filed a motion
 
for summary judgment. Based on representations from Coleman 's
 
counsel that an expert had been retained, the trial court denied
 
the summary judgment motion and permitted Coleman ten additional
 
days in which to file her expert report.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 -3-
 
     Coleman presented a letter from Dr. Rodney Appell as the
 
expert report. Dr. Appell was the physician who successfully
 
treated Coleman's condition. Because Dr. Appell's letter did not
 
include an opinion regarding the standard of care as it related to
 
Dr. Fitzgerald's treatment, Kaiser filed a motion for summary
 
judgment, which was unopposed by Coleman. The trial court granted
 
Dr. Fitzgerald's motion.
 
     Coleman appeals and argues the trial court erred by granting
 
summary judgment when disputed issues of fact remained regarding
 
whether Dr. Fitzgerald breached his standard of care.
 
     We consider an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo
 
standard of review.  1 Accordingly, we afford no deference to the
 
trial court's decision and independently review the record to
 
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.2 Under Civ.R. 56,
 
summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) no genuine issue as to any
 
material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is
 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the
 
evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable
 
 
 
 
     1Baiko v. Mays (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 1, citing Smiddy v. The
Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35; Northeast Ohio Apt.
Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 188.
 
     2Id. at 192, citing Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87
Ohio App.3d 704.
 
 
 
 
                               -4-
 
minds can only reach one conclusion which is adverse to the non-
 
moving party.3
 
     The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth
 
specific facts which demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary
 
judgment.4 If the movant fails to meet this burden, summary
 
judgment is not appropriate; if the movant does meet this burden,
 
summary judgment will only be appropriate if the non-movant fails
 
to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.5
 
     In the instant case, Kaiser 's motion was not opposed by
 
Coleman. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate when the
 
nonmoving party does not produce evidence on any issue for which
 
that party bears the burden of production at trial. 6  Of course,
 
even when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the motion
 
and supporting evidence must show the absence of any material fact
 
before the court can grant the motion. 7  This is demonstrated by
 
the language of Civ.R. 56(E) which states that if a party does not
 
oppose a motion for summary judgment, "summary judgment, if
 
 
 
 
     3
     Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1997), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327.
 
     4
     Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 1996-Ohio-107.
 
     5
     Id. at 293.
 
     6
     Abram v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., Cuyahoga
App. No. 80127, 2002-Ohio-2622 at §43.
 
     7
     Charles Gruenspan Co. v. Thompson, Cuyahoga App. No. 80748,
2003-Ohio-3641.
 
 
 
                                -5-
 
appropriate, shall be entered against the party. "8 Thus, we will
 
not consider any argument Coleman makes in response to the summary
 
judgment, except insofar as those arguments point to issues of
 
material facts in the respective motions and supporting evidentiary
 
materials.
 
       The Ohio Supreme Court has long held that in order to
 
establish medical malpractice, the plaintiff must show: 1) the
 
standard of care recognized by the medical community, 2) the
 
failure of the defendant to meet the requisite standard of care,
 
and, 3) a direct causal connection between the medically negligent
 
act and the injury sustained.9 It is well established that failure
 
to provide the recognized standards of the medical community is
 
fatal to the presentation of a prima facie case of medical
 
malpractice.10 The exception to that rule is "in cases where the
 
nature of the case is such that the lack of skill or care of the
 
physician and surgeon is so apparent as to be within the
 
comprehension of laymen and requires only common knowledge and
 
experience to understand and judge it."11
 
 
 
 
     8
     Id., citing to Mullen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
(C.A.1, 1992), 972 F.2d 446, 452.
 
     9
     Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, paragraph one of
the syllabus.
 
     10Rogoff v. King (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 438, 444; Jones v.
Roche Laboratories (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 135, 139.
 
     11
      Id.
 
 
 
                                -6-
 
     In this case, Coleman's expert does not offer an opinion on
 
whether Dr. Fitzgerald violated the standard of care recognized by
 
the medical community. Dr. Appell's letter to Coleman's attorney
 
provided a summary of care Coleman received from both Kaiser and
 
Dr. Appell. He also opined that Kaiser delayed treating Colemans '
 
condition, which created discomfort to her. He finished by
 
stating, "[I]f the individuals at Kaiser did not feel that they
 
could accomplish the appropriate surgical intervention, then there
 
is no question that she should have been referred to someone who
 
could treat her in a more definitive fashion." This opinion does
 
not satisfy Coleman's burden to present expert testimony that Dr.
 
Fitzgerald's care deviated from the standard of care as set forth
 
in the medical community. It simply set forth Dr. Appell's opinion
 
the treatment of Coleman should have been handled differently.
 
     We note that Coleman has not attempted to argue at any stage
 
of the proceedings that the common knowledge exception to the
 
requirement of an expert opinion applies. A review of Coleman 's
 
claims demonstrate that she would need an expert to establish the
 
standard of care and causation of her injury because the difference
 
in symptoms between a urinary tract infection as diagnosed by Dr.
 
Fitzgerald and a urinary diverticulum are not within the common
 
knowledge of a lay person.
 
     We also note the trial court granted Kaiser's motion in limine
 
to exclude the testimony of Dr. Appell because he failed to present

an opinion relating to whether Dr. Fitzgerald breached the standard
 
of care as recognized in the medical community. In fact, in his
 
deposition, he stated he was retained not to give his opinion on
 
Dr. Fitzgerald's care, but only to provide information regarding
 
his care of Coleman. Therefore, the matter never would have
 
proceeded beyond a directed verdict if it had gone to trial.
 
Accordingly, Coleman's sole assigned error is overruled.
 
     Judgment affirmed.
 
 
                                -8-
 
     It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs
 
herein taxed.
 
     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
 
     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
 
directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
 
execution.
 
     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate
 
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and
 
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR.
 
 
                                       PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON
                                          PRESIDING JUDGE
 
 
 
 
     N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision.
See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision
will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the
court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration
with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10)
days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period
for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the
journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the
clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section
2(A)(1).